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Social agreement as to the redistribution of wealth is often unattainable because the 
poor cannot adequately compensate the rich for their contribution. In this paper, we submit 
that under certain circumstances, such an agreement may obtain support if, and only if, it were 
to contain a clause postponing the implementation of the redistribution by a given period of 
time. Thus, despite the fact that at present or at any future point in time, no consensus on 
redistribution could be reached, society can reach an agreement to redistribute wealth in the 
future.  
We term such an agreement a “deferred-implementation agreement” and identify two 
reasons, not yet identified in the literature, which could explain the appeal of such an 
agreement.  The first reason is that the rich take into account the possibility that in the future 
they might be compelled to exchange sides with the poor and become the beneficiaries of the 
redistribution scheme, rather than its financiers. The second reason is that a deferred-
implementation agreement entails externalization of costs to third parties thereby reducing the 
costs of the agreement to its parties.  
In addition to promoting consensus in society regarding redistribution of wealth, 
which, in itself, might be virtuous, deferred-implementation agreements can also be justified 
on normative grounds. First, by setting the terrain for a potential sides’ exchange, the parties 
to the agreement are placed behind the veil of ignorance, or at least closer to this position, and 
are thereby encouraged to make an unbiased decision as to whether to enter into the social 
agreement.  Second, despite the inefficiencies commonly associated with externalities, the 
externalization of costs from the present generation to future generations and to others who 
are ultimately expected to benefit from the agreement might be a Pareto-improving move that 
promotes intergenerational justice.  
Arguably, if deferred-implementation of social agreements were such an attractive 
option as we contend, one should expect to observe a broad use of those agreements in the 
real world. We believe that the reason for the rarity of deferred-implementation agreements is 
the parties’ concern that future generations would find the attempt of the previous generation 
to bind them illegitimate and undemocratic and will therefore evade the implementation of 
such agreements. However, if the parties to these agreements utilized certain mechanisms and 
adopted a few constraints that we discuss in the paper, the legitimacy of the agreements could 
be enhanced and they would become less vulnerable to future nullification. 
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Unlike private contracts, many social agreements are not expected to enlarge the social 
pie but rather to redistribute wealth from one group of citizens to another, typically from the 
rich to the poor. Social agreement for the redistribution of wealth
1 is often unattainable 
because the poor cannot adequately compensate the rich for their contribution. In this paper, 
we submit that in some circumstances, such an agreement may obtain wide support if and 
only if it were to contain a clause postponing the implementation of the redistribution by a 
given period of time. Thus, despite the fact that at present or at any future point in time, no 
consensus on redistribution could be reached, society can reach an agreement to redistribute 
wealth in the future. We term such an agreement a “deferred-implementation agreement” and 
identify two reasons, not yet identified in the literature, which could explain the appeal of 
such an agreement.
2
The first reason why parties would occasionally be more willing to enter into a 
deferred-implementation agreement, as opposed to an immediate-implementation agreement, 
                                                 
† Dean and Vice-Dean, respectively, Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University. For helpful discussions 
and comments we wish to thank Daphne Barak-Erez, Meir Dan-Cohen, David Enoch, Oren Gazal, Ayal Gross, 
Amos Israel, Tzachi Keren-Paz, Saul Levmore, Nira Liberman, Eric Posner, Yoram Shachar Jennifer Shakbator, 
Doron Teichman and Adrian Vermeule, as well as the participants in the law faculty workshops at Bar Ilan 
University and Tel Aviv University. Jennifer Shakbator provided superb research assistance.  
1 The expression “social agreement” is used in this article in a broad sense to encompass both intra- and inter- 
state agreements. 
2 A variety of reasons may warrant deferring the implementation of a social agreement. Occasionally, particular 
circumstances may render immediate implementation either physically impossible or particularly difficult. In 
other cases, deferring specific elements of implementation until a future date leads to its gradual implementation, 
allowing the parties to adapt themselves to changes brought by the agreement and also enhance the building of 
trust between them. In yet other cases, deferring the implementation of the agreement is considered by the 
performing party cheaper than immediate implementation, because of a discount factor attached to future 
performance especially when there is some level of uncertainty as to whether the performance will take place at 
all. This article will not deal with these reasons, most of which are well known and not unique to social 
agreements.  
Scholars working in the field of behavioral psychology, explored the effect of deferments on the parties’ 
conceptions’ of chances and risks. See e.g.: George Loewenstein, Anticipation and Valuation of Delayed 
Consumption, 97 The Economic J. 666 (1987); Yaakov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 
Psychological Review (in Press). This topic is also beyond the scope of our present paper. 
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implementation of the redistribution takes place. The potential of exchanging sides reduces 
the cost of the agreement to the rich and makes them less reluctant to enter into the 
agreement. Consider, for example, a program to reduce unemployment by restricting the 
number of weekly hours each employee is allowed to work. Assume that such a law could not 
be enacted if the workers and the unemployed failed to reach a social agreement on that 
matter. Arguably, workers who feel their jobs in the near future are relatively secure would 
refuse to give up part of their paid work hours. However, knowing that in ten years time, 
some of them may exchange sides to join the ranks of the unemployed, the workers might be 
less reluctant to support the proposed law if its implementation were to be deferred by ten 
years. The potential of the individuals composing the group of the workers to exchange sides 
in the future, reduces the costs of the agreement to each such individual and increases the 
likelihood they would support the deal.  
In order to make the deferred-implementation agreement an attractive option for 
parties to social agreements, it is crucial to immune the agreement from future attempts of the 
“rich” party to withdraw the agreement when it reaches the time of implementation. Thus, in 
the unemployment example, there is a substantial risk, that in ten years time, the median 
voter, being employed, would still oppose the execution of the program, and the law 
restricting the weekly work hours will therefore be abolished. One way to achieve such 
immunity is by incorporating the deferred-implementation agreement into the constitution. 
Article One, Section Nine, of the U.S. Constitution, which postponed by twenty years 
Congress’ power to prohibit the migration and importation of slaves, is one example for such 
a constitutional protection. 
The second reason why parties would accept a deferred-implementation agreement, 
where they would reject the same agreement with immediate implementation, is that it often 
entails externalization of costs to third parties, thereby reducing the costs of the agreement to 
the contracting parties. Thus, if the Israelis enter into an agreement with the Palestinians to 
recognize a Palestinian limited right of return, but postpone its implementation by fifteen 
years, the present generation of Israelis would be externalizing part of the costs of the 
agreement to third parties—namely, to the future generations of Israelis and immigrants to 
Israel over the next fifteen years. This externalization would diminish the costs of the 
agreement borne by the present generation, thereby increasing its willingness to enter into 
such an agreement. Again, knowing that the future majority would oppose the deal, the 
present members of society would strive to bind the future generation and make the 
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In addition to promoting consensus in society regarding redistribution of wealth, 
which, in itself, might be virtuous, the two consequences of the deferral of the implementation 
of a social agreement—the potential of the parties to exchange sides and externalization of 
costs to third parties—have internal, normative justifications as well. First, the potential of 
exchanging sides places the parties to the agreement behind the veil of ignorance, or at least 
closer to this position, and encourages them to make a less biased decision as to whether to 
enter into the social agreement. Second, despite the inefficiencies commonly associated with 
externalities, the externalization of costs from the present generation to future generations and 
to others who are expected to benefit from the agreement, might be a Pareto-improving move 
that promotes intergenerational justice.  
Arguably, if deferred-implementation social agreements were such an attractive option 
as we contend, one should expect to observe much more of those agreements in the real world 
than the few we actually observe. We believe that the reason for the rarity of deferred-
implementation agreements is the parties’ concern that future generations would find the 
attempt of the previous generation to bind them unconstitutional and undemocratic and 
therefore would find their ways out of the agreements. Having this concern in mind, both 
parties to the potential social agreement believe that deferred-implementation agreements are 
ineffective, since immunity from future changes cannot really be achieved. However, as we 
suggest later in the paper, if the parties to a deferred-implementation agreement would use 
certain mechanisms and subject themselves to several constraints that we propose, the 
legitimacy of those agreements will be recognized, and they will be less vulnerable to future 
nullification. Consequently, the use of deferred-implementation agreements would be much 
more common. 
Part I of the paper discusses the symmetric situation, in which the externalization of 
costs and the potential of exchanging sides by deferring the implementation of a social 
agreement identically reduces the consideration given by one party and received by the other. 
Part II proceeds with the asymmetric situation in which externalization of costs and the 
potential of exchanging sides affect each party differently. The purpose of these two parts is 
to point out paradigmatic cases, which invite the use of deferred implementation agreements. 
Part III turns to the normative question and substantiates our contention that deferred 
implementation in the cases discussed in the previous parts of the paper produces socially 
desirable outcomes. In Part IV we conclude and offer some general perspectives.  
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A. Deferred Implementation - in General 
 
Assume a seller interested in selling a four apartment building, and a buyer whose 
financial ability extends to the purchase of one apartment only. Should the seller insist on 
selling the entire building as a whole, conceivably there might be no transaction between the 
seller and the buyer. On the other hand, assuming the seller’s willingness to sell one 
apartment, a transaction might take place. The seller’s willingness to sell less than the 
complete item in return for reduced consideration, and the buyer’s willingness to settle for less 
than the complete item at a lower price, could accommodate a transaction that would not 
otherwise have been concluded. 
Let us change the example and assume that the seller has just the one apartment, the 
buyer is unable to pay the price the seller is asking and there is no sense in selling parts of the 
apartment or alternatively, such sale is legally impossible. Is there any chance of a transaction 
nonetheless being concluded? As in the first example, reducing the consideration given by the 
seller to the buyer with the parallel reduction of the price paid by the buyer may facilitate an 
agreement in the second case too. One way of reducing the consideration given by the seller is 
to defer transfer of the apartment for five years. This solution might suit both parties, and a 
transaction between them would be concluded. Deferred implementation is therefore a 
possible method for reducing the consideration given by one party to the other, which results 
in the reduction of the consideration required from the second party. 
The solution of deferred implementation in the example of the apartment is not the 
only possible solution. In developed countries, parties can also bridge gaps by utilizing credit 
markets: a purchaser takes out a loan on the market, immediately purchases an apartment and 
then finances the loan repayment with rental payments he receives over the next five years 
during which the apartment is rented. These arrangements however typify the private market; 
political or social groups do not generally utilize the credit market for bridging gaps between 
them. So, where social agreements are concerned, deferred implementation is likely to be the 
preferred technique for their attainment. 
The following example illustrates the possible use of deferred implementation for 
reduction of the consideration given by one party to the other, in a manner enabling the 
attainment of an international agreement.  
 
  5
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressThe peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.
3 Israel and Egypt are 
attempting to reach a peace agreement. Both parties have realized that an 
essential part of a peace agreement will be the return of the entire Sinai 
Peninsula to Egypt. Israel is prepared to give away all of these areas but 
demands in return: full normalization, exchange of ambassadors, open 
borders, commercial relations, tourism etc (hereafter – full peace). Such 
consideration is extremely high from the Egyptian perspective: giving it to 
Israel might be prohibitively costly in the international arena in terms of its 
relations with the other Arab states, as well as on the internal Egyptian front. 
The result is that Egypt is unwilling to give the full consideration required to 
convince Israel to withdraw immediately from the entire Sinai Peninsula. 
 
How does one bridge the gap between the parties? One option is for Israel to be 
content with less than full peace and for Egypt to be content with less than the entire Sinai 
Peninsula. However, as stated, the underlying assumption is that Egypt cannot content itself 
with anything less than the return of the entire Sinai Peninsula. The practical method of 
reducing the price paid by Israel without slicing up the Sinai Peninsula may be the deferment 
of the date upon which Israel gives the Peninsula back to Egypt. Our assumption is that 
deferment by a few years reduces the consideration being given by Israel, and symmetrically 
reduces the consideration that Egypt is receiving.
4 Reduction of the consideration given by 
Israel and received by Egypt allows Israel to consent to consideration less than what it would 
have demanded as consideration for the immediate return of the entire territory. Accordingly, 
Israel may content itself with a cold peace and all in all, pose fewer conditions for signing an 
agreement with Egypt.  
In sum, if one party is unwilling to conclude a transaction for the full consideration 
required by the other party, deferred implementation could be an effective technique for 
reducing this consideration, and facilitating an agreement between the parties which would 
have not been concluded, absent the deferment. In both of the examples above, deferral of the 
implementation of the agreement reduces the contribution of one party – the seller or Israel, 
simply because, with positive interest rates, pushing delivery to a future date reduces its net 
present value. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that deferral of implementation might 
reduce the net present value of the deal even if we assume zero interest rates. 
In the next sections we will observe how deferred implementation, which externalizes 
                                                 
3 The example is adjusted to illustrate our contention and does not purport to be historically accurate. 
4 Our assumption is that the deferment operates equally on both parties. In other words, the benefit derived by 
Israel from possession of the territories over the next five years is more or less equal to the benefit that the 
Egyptians would gain from possessing the territories during those five years. If the deferment had an 
asymmetrical effect on the parties, in the sense that the costs of non-deferment to Israel exceeded the costs of 
deferment to Egypt, this would be an additional reason for deferment, which will be discussed in the following 
chapter.  
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the consideration given by one party and received by the other party, and for the subsequent 
attainment of social agreement that would otherwise not have been attained.  
 
B. Cost Externalization  
Private law adopts various methods for confronting the problem of externalized costs. 
Contracts that externalize costs to third parties are frequently unenforceable. In certain cases, 
third parties to whom the costs are externalized have actionable claims in tort against the 
contracting parties. In some cases, the criminal law too discourages externalization of costs by 
imposing sanctions on the externalizing parties, thereby deter them from creating these 
externalities in the first place. 
Social agreements too are liable to cause externalization of costs to third parties. An 
effective method of creating externalization is by deferring the implementation of a social 
agreement. Concededly, externalization may also occur where implementation is immediate, 
except that where implementation is immediate there is a high chance that third parties 
exposed to externalization will oppose it and attempt to frustrate the attainment of the social 
agreement. Deferred implementation, on the other hand, typically externalizes costs on the 
future generations, who by definition are unable to frustrate the attainment of the agreement in 
the present.  
  
  The prohibition on slave trade. In 1787 the states then comprising the United 
States agreed to the contents of the American Constitution, which determined 
inter alia that until the year 1808 the Federal Congress would not prohibit 
slave trade.
5 This compromise between the Northern States and the Southern 
States was necessary to prevent the breaking up of the Federation.
6 The 
compromise had two aspects: on the one hand the Northern States undertook 
not to alter the status quo for a period of twenty years. The Southern States on 
the other hand agreed that in twenty years time the Federal Congress would be 
authorized to prohibit slave trade.  
 
One explanation
7 for the deferment of the abolition of slave trade is the one suggested 
                                                 
5 Section 9 of the first chapter of the Constitution states the following: 
“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, 
shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or a 
duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.” 
6 Hugh Thomas, “The Slave Trade” The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440-1870 (New York, Simon and 
Schuster, 1997) 500. 
7 There are alternative explanations for the deferment of the date upon which Congress is empowered to prohibit 
slave trade. See e.g. Randy E.Barnett, “The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause” 68 U. Ch. L. Rev. 101 
(2001); Paul Finkelman, “The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained” 13 Yale J. L. & Human. 
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for the white population of the South, a price that they would not have been willing to pay in 
return for the expected benefits of unification. The Northern states on the other hand, were 
prepared to accept a lower consideration. One way of reducing the consideration given by the 
Southern States was by deferment of implementation for a period of twenty years.
8 This 
deferment entitled the white residents of the Southern States to benefit from an additional 
twenty years of slave trade. Concomitantly, the deferment reduced the benefit gained by the 
Northern States from the prohibition on slave trade.
9
Clearly the social agreement between the Northern and the Southern states was reached 
at the expense of third parties and due to the fact that the consent of those third parties was not 
required. The main victims of deferring the abolition of slave trade were the slaves 
themselves, who remained tradable objects for an additional twenty years. Arguably, the 
future white residents of the Southern States, who were denied the right to trade slaves, also 
bore some of the costs of this social agreement. 
But for one way or another, whether implementation was immediate or deferred, the 
future slave traders were to become subject to congressional power to prohibit slave trade. It 
may therefore be claimed that the deferment had no negative effects on these potential future 
slave traders. To generalize the latter point, one should bear in mind that any law that is not 
limited in time, whether its implementation is immediate or deferred, imposes certain costs on 
the next generations. Arguably, therefore, as long as the deferral does not raise the costs the 
next generations incur, the externalization problem is the same whether the implementation is 
immediate or deferred. The externalization problem is of particular concern however, when 
the deferral is the cause of the externalization.  
                                                                                                                                                          
413 (2001); James Oakes, “Bondage, Freedom & the Constitution: The New Slavery and Its Impact on Law and 
Legal Historiography” 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 2023 (1996); Tania Tetlow, “The Founders and Slavery: A Crisis of 
Conscience” 3 Loy. J. Pub. International. L.1 (2001) 
We do not claim that our explanation is historically correct, nor do we have the required expertise to make such a 
claim. We use the example of slavery in order to illustrate our claim, and to show how it could theoretically 
provide a possible explanation for the example. 
8 We do not intend to claim that in the example of the prohibition of slave trade the deferred implementation was 
the only mechanism for reaching agreement. Conceivably, another compromise could have been reached. For 
example, the parties could have agreed to an immediate, but partial restriction on slave trade. In fact both the 
Northern and the Southern States also agreed to the imposition of a tax on such trade and the agreement came 
into force immediately, which contributed, presumably, to an immediate reduction in its scope. Even so, the 
Northern States wanted to empower the Federal Government to absolutely prohibit slave trade, and apparently 
consent to a blanket empowerment was only possible by way of deferred implementation.  
9 It could be claimed that the reduction of the consideration was not symmetric: the residents of the Northern 
States derived benefit from the actual political and ideological achievement, and conceivably from their 
perspective the deferment was not as meaningful as was its non-deferment for the white residents of the Southern 
States. 
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such, is the cause of the externalization, we distinguish between a social agreement, which 
entails the transfer of a finite consideration – either of a fixed magnitude or for a definite time 
period -- and a social agreement, which entails the transfer of an infinite consideration. In both 
cases deferred implementation improves the position of the members of the current generation 
who would have had to bear the cost of the agreement, and worsens the position of the 
members of the current generation who were supposed to benefit from it. However, in the first 
case, the deferment imposes costs on the next generation from which they would have been 
spared had implementation been immediate, and in the second case the next generation bears 
the cost irrespective of whether implementation is immediate or deferred. For example, the 
empowerment of Congress to prohibit slave trade was an agreement of permanent duration 
and therefore, prima facia, the consideration transferred from the Southern States to the 
Northern States was infinite in nature. Consequently, whether the implementation of the ban 
on slave trade was immediate or twenty years later was irrelevant for the next generation of 
potential slave traders, since in any event they would have been subject to the power of 
Congress to prohibit slave trade.
10 The consequence of this deferment was that the slaves 
would pay the price, together with those Northern States interested in the immediate abolition 
of slave trade, but the deferment had no intergenerational implications. On the other hand, if 
instead the constitution had obliged the slave proprietors to pay one time indemnification to 
the slaves, then the timing of implementation would have generated intergenerational 
implications. Immediate implementation would impose the costs exclusively upon the 
generation of slave proprietors in whose time the constitution was adopted and improve only 
the position of those slaves in whose time the constitution was adopted. Deferring 
implementation for twenty years, on the other hand, would impose its costs exclusively on the 




                                                 
10 Arguably, however, slave proprietors that are forced to send their slaves free suffer more than those potential 
proprietors that are denied the right to slaves they have never owned. Thus, although the deal involves an infinite 
consideration, most of the costs are incurred by the generation in which the agreement is implemented. For a 
further discussion of this “endowment effect” see infra  
11 It must be emphasized that this distinction is not always precise. For example, some of the slave proprietors in 
the current generation will also be slave proprietors in the next generation. Furthermore, some of the proprietors 
in the current generation will desire to sell their slaves (or the offspring of slaves) in the future, and the price of 
these slaves will be affected by the fact that the purchaser will be subject to the obligation to pay compensation 
to this slave. This makes it clear that some of the compensation will also be paid by the slave proprietors of the 
current generation. At the same time, it is clear that if implementation of the law were immediate, its cost would 
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It frequently occurs in social agreements for the redistribution of wealth that the 
bearers of agreement’s costs, or “the givers”, are in the course of time prone to become the 
beneficiaries of the social agreement, or the “receivers”. Similarly, the “receivers” are likely to 
become the “givers”. This phenomenon of sides’ exchange primarily characterizes social 
agreements, and is rare in the area of private agreements between individuals.
12 In 
circumstances where a future sides’ exchange is expected, deferment of the social agreement 
blurs the distinction between the givers and the receivers, for today’s givers may be 
tomorrow’s receivers. This in turn may increase the willingness of the givers to agree, because 
the prospect of sides’ exchange occasioned by deferred implementation reduces the 
consideration that they are required to give. In the symmetrical situation the deferred 
implementation and increased prospects of sides’ exchange as a result, effects a parallel and 
identical reduction in the consideration given and received. In this situation the parties may 
prefer deferred implementation if today’s receivers are unable to offer today’s givers a 
consideration which convince the latter to render immediate implementation. 
 
  Unemployment. Assume that the rate of unemployment could be reduced by 
a law that limits work hours, so that those employed will work less, and the 
unemployed will join the work force. For example, after the 1997 elections 
the French legislator tried to reduce unemployment by adopting a law that 
restrict the weekly working hours of France employees to 35.
13 Such a 
restriction improves the position of the unemployed and worsens that of the 
workers. Assume that legislation in this spirit requires a coalition of the 
workers and the unemployed. Also assume that the workers demand a high 
price for such a concession and the unemployed do not have the sufficient 
resources to pay the price. All that they can offer the workers is “industrial 
peace” and this consideration does not satisfy the workers. Can the gap 
between the parties be bridged? Can a social agreement be reached which 
would enable legislation? 
 
Suppose that a social agreement is proposed to the workers and to the unemployed in 
                                                                                                                                                          
be born exclusively by the current slave proprietors.  
12 As between individuals, it is rather rare that a party to a contract will exchange sides. Still, corporate contracts 
are often structured in a way that increases the probability of sides’ exchange. Thus, a firm could confer shares 
or options to its employees or creditors, thereby making it feasible that the present employees and creditors will 
be future shareholders. 
13 The socialist government that won the 1997 elections in France aimed to reduce the high unemployment rate 
by way of restricting the number of weekly hours to 35 hours (previously the weekly hours quota was 39 hours). 
The government passed two statutes (Aubry Statutes): Statute No. 98-461 and Statute No. 37-2000 which 
determined that as of 1.1.2000 this rule would apply only in those work places that employed more than 20 
workers and from 1.1.2002 it would apply to all work places. 
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agreement would be deferred for fifteen years. Presumably, from their own perspective, the 
workers would regard this as a “lower” price to pay for industrial peace than its alternative, by 
which the law would be immediately implemented. Consequently, they would be more willing 
to accept the social agreement. One trivial reason why the workers will regard the price as 
lower than the price they would pay if the law were to be immediately implemented is that a 
deferred implementation gives them fifteen more years of full employment. But there is an 
additional reason for the workers to regard deferred implementation as cheaper than the 
solution of immediate implementation. Every worker knows that without the law, he may find 
himself unemployed in fifteen years time, whereas every unemployed person knows that in 
another fifteen years he is liable to be working. Accordingly, deferred implementation means 
that a significant part of the law’s costs are actually borne by today’s unemployed, and some 
of its benefits are conferred to today’s workers.
14
It should be noted that the reduction of consideration due to the sides’ exchange caused 
by deferred implementation operates symmetrically upon the workers and the unemployed. 
Deferred implementation for fifteen years does not just reduce the consideration given by the 
workers; it also reduces the consideration received by the unemployed. Facially, this invites 
the conclusion that parties have nothing to gain by deferred implementation and would prefer 
immediate implementation. However, since we assume that obtaining agreement for 
immediate implementation is not possible, the real alternatives confronting the parties are 
either absence of any agreement or, agreement that the new law will come into force in 
another fifteen years. Deferred implementation for fifteen years and the possibility of sides’ 
exchange as a result, reduces the consideration required by today’s workers and even if it 
simultaneously reduces the consideration received by those currently unemployed, it might 
facilitate the agreement, which could not have otherwise attained. 
15
                                                 
14 Admittedly, even if the implementation of the law was immediate, it could still benefit the workers, because 
every worker might in the future become unemployed. But it is reasonable to assume that at the time the law is 
enacted each worker’s chances of losing her job in the far future are higher than in the near future. As a result, 
the deferred implementation increases the chances of the workers to benefit from the law.  
15 Here too it could be argued that the parties can reduce the consideration in another manner. For example, 
instead of the workers waiving a day of work as of a particular date in 15 years time, the parties could agree on 
an immediate waiver on the workers’ part of half a days work. Nonetheless, the implicit assumption in this 
example is that just as there is no possibility of agreeing to sell half of an apartment, on the return of part of the 
Sinai Peninsuala, or the partial abolition of slavery, so too it is impossible, or at least most inefficient, to divide a 
work day into two. This assumption could of course be challenged. For example, it could be claimed that even if 
one cannot split a work day into two, one could alternate the length of the worker’s week so that one week he is 
employed for five days and the next week for four days, so that the final result would be an average of four and a 
half days a week. Alternatively, one could limit the numbers of hours in a week (this is what was actually done 
in France).  
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A. Deferred Implementation – in General 
 
Contracting parties may agree to defer the implementation of a contract, since the 
benefit that one party may receive from the deferment exceeds the costs it creates for the other 
party. Thus, returning to the example of the buyer and seller of an apartment, conceivably the 
seller may have a particular use for the apartment over the next five years, which is worth 
more to him than the value of the purchaser’s use. In such circumstances one could expect that 
the parties, if entering into a contract, would defer its implementation for five years. 
This applies similarly to social agreements. The achievement of the Israel-Egypt peace 
agreement, under which the parties chose to defer the return of the Sinai Peninsula, could be 
explained inter alia as the result of the benefit accruing to Israel from holding the territories 
for another five years exceeding the benefit gained by Egypt from immediately receiving the 
territories back. In this kind of cases, deferment of implementation increases the aggregate 
benefits the parties gain from the contract. There are cases in which this increase of aggregate 
benefits may be a condition for reaching any agreement.  
Two main reasons may cause the benefit gained by the giver to exceed the cost born by 
the receiver from deferring the implementation of the agreement. 
One reason, illustrated above, relates to the objective benefit gained by the giver and 
receiver of implementation from deferment and non-deferment, respectively. In the example 
of the apartment, the different uses of the parties from the asset and the variant benefits 
attained therefrom, may justify the deferment of implementation. In the example of the peace 
agreement between Israel and Egypt, the different interests of the parties regarding the 
implementation date of the agreement and the different benefits gained by the realization of 
these interests, may also justify the deferment of implementation.  
A second reason, which may cause the parties to defer the implementation of their 
agreement, relates to their different assessments of what the future holds in store. The issue 
here is not one of different objective benefits, but rather different assessments of those benefits 
by the parties to the agreement. Thus, suppose that in the example of the seller and buyer of 
the apartment, the buyer believes that over the next five years tax will be imposed on the rental 
of apartments whereas the seller does not believe that the tax will be imposed. Even though 
the objective benefit for the seller and the buyer from possession of the asset for the next five 
years is identical (both parties designated the apartment for rental), their assessments of the 
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apartment.
16
In certain cases this second reason may also justify the deferment of a social 
agreement. The following example illustrates this. 
 
Division of Jerusalem The Palestinians are prepared to sign a peace agreement 
with Israel, on the condition that a short time after the signing of the 
agreement, East Jerusalem becomes the Palestinian Capital. In order for Israel 
to sign a peace agreement there is a need for the consent of the right and the 
left. The right opposes the signing of the peace agreement because it 
adamantly opposes East Jerusalem becoming the Palestinian capital. The left 
on the other hand supports this. The benefit gained by the right in not signing 
the agreement is equal to the benefit of the left in its signing.  
 
How can one bridge the gap between the left and the right? One option is to propose to 
the Palestinians that the implementation of the undertaking to make East Jerusalem into the 
Palestinian Capital be deferred for five years. It is clear to both the right and the left that if the 
Palestinians do not keep their part of the agreement, then East Jerusalem will not be given to 
them. The left believes that the Palestinians will not violate the agreement during the next five 
years. The right on the other hand believes that the agreement will be violated. Under such 
circumstances it may be possible to conclude an agreement between the right and the left, 
under which in another five years East Jerusalem will become the Palestinian capital, if the 
Palestinians keep their part of the peace agreement to be signed, until that time. The right has a 
different assessment than the left (and the Palestinians) regarding what is likely to occur in the 
next five years and it is the diverse assessment which may allow them to reach an agreement 
which would not have been possible without the deferment of implementation.
17
In the following sections we discuss two additional reasons for the benefit gained by 
the giver of implementation exceeding the benefit gained by the receiver from immediate 
implementation. The first reason is the externalizations of costs and the second is in the sides’ 
                                                 
16 Alternatively, the parties could transfer ownership immediately and agree that should tax be imposed, it would 
be chargeable to the seller. 
17 A third reason, which could cause the parties to agree to defer the implementation of the agreement, is 
disparate attitudes to risks. For even if the implementation receiver and the implementation giver derive identical 
benefit from immediate or deferred implementation respectively, and even if they share identical assessments 
with respect to what the future holds in store, their disparate attitudes to risk could, from their perspective, justify 
deferring the implementation of their agreement. Suppose that in the example of the seller and the buyer of an 
apartment, both sides have a shared assessment regarding the chances of tax being imposed on the income from 
the apartment. They both estimate a likelihood of 50% that tax will not be imposed at all, in which case their 
income from the apartment would be 100, and a likelihood of 50% that tax will be imposed, thus reducing the 
income to 50. The expected income over the next five years would therefore be 75 according to both of them. 
Suppose now that the seller is risk neutral while the buyer is risk averse. In that case both parties would prefer to 
defer implementation of the contract for five years, so that the risk neutral seller would have to bear it.  
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B. Cost Externalization 
Occasionally, one party to the social agreement expects to externalize a large portion 
of his implementation costs if implementation is deferred and the second party expects to 
receive most of the benefits even if implementation is deferred. In these cases the deferment of 
implementation increases the chances of reaching a social agreement.  
 
  The Pension Program. The legislator considers the adoption of a national 
pension insurance program, under which every person over the age of 65 will 
be entitled to a pension and all people from the age of 18 up to 65 will pay a 
tax which would finance the pension payments. On average, the older the 
person is, the lower the tax he pays and the more annuities he receives. To 
illustrate, a person who is 64, and expects to retire in another year, will have 
to pay the tax for a period of only one year and after that will enjoy the 
pension for the rest of his days. A person who is 55 on the other hand, would 
have to pay for the arrangement for a period of ten years prior to retirement 
and there is a higher probability that he will not actually make it to pension 
age, and thus would not derive any benefit from the proposed program. 
Obviously, there is a certain age at which the cost of the tax is equal to the 
benefit from the pension program. We shall assume that this age is 30, and 
therefore people younger than 30 (“the youth”) will lose from the arrangement 
and those older (“the adults”) than that age would profit from it. 
 
Suppose that in order to legally adopt the pension program, there must be agreement 
between the ‘youth’ and the ‘adults’. This necessitates an arrangement which increases the 
willingness of the youth to be part of the agreement. Immediate implementation of the 
program would aggravate the position of the youth and would therefore be opposed. On the 
other hand, deferring implementation for 12 years would appreciably reduce the price to be 
paid by today’s youth. In another 12 years, the youth will have become adults and the program 
improves their position. The ones required to pay the costs of the deferment are the “children”, 
who are currently below 18, and who in 12 years time will have to bear the costs, that are 
greater than the benefits they stand to gain by the program. Deferred implementation therefore 
creates a situation in which some of the costs potentially born by the youth in the event of 
immediate implementation are externalized and imposed on the shoulders of the children. 
In the pension example, externalization of costs operates asymmetrically on different 
age groups. Youth, and some of the adults too (primarily those beneath the age of 53
18) profit 
                                                 
18 But not only them; those who are between 53-65 would save the tax costs, but also lose pension payments. 
Within that sub-group, to the extent that a person is closer to pension age his profits from the deferment 
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prefer the national pension program to be implemented immediately. The reason that the latter 
agree to the deferment is that without such deferment there will be no pension program at all. 
The fact that the children who were not party to the agreement on the pension program, are 
financing substantial part of the program, could prove that the profit gained by the youth from 
the deferment exceeds the loss to the adults, and this is the source of the asymmetry created by 
the deferment.  
In the following example, deferment of the implementation of the social agreement 
externalizes costs and benefits in a facially symmetrical manner except that due to the 
conflicting value given by the parties to the externalized values, an asymmetric situation 
emerges. Consequently deferring the implementation increases the chances of reaching 
agreement. 
The Israeli Arabs. The Israeli Arabs demand that the Israeli budget would be 
allocated equally between the Jewish and the Arab sectors. The government in 
power represents primarily the Jewish sector and desires to placate the Arab 
sector and attain its cooperation, but at the same time the price requested by 
the Israeli Arabs seems too high for the government, and it is neither able nor 
willing to pay it.  
 
One possible solution to the above Israeli-Arab intrastate conflict is a compromise 
around the price, namely, the government will increase the budget allocated to the Arabs but 
not to the full extent required by them. Therefore, such a solution will not attain the support of 
the Arab minority. Whereas the Jewish majority is troubled only by the effect of the deal on 
their standard of living, the Arabs strive to achieve political equality, and therefore, cannot 
support any deal that offers them anything less then full equality.  
Our claim is that in such cases, it might be easier to attain a compromise over the time 
line rather than over the price. The Arabs might prefer a scheme that promises them full 
equality in fifteen years over a scheme that ensures them an immediate, but moderate increase 
in the budget, even if the net present value of the budget payments they receive under both 
deals is the same. Looking at the problem from the Jewish population point of view, they 
would also prefer deferment because of their expectation to externalize some of the costs to 
the future generations.  
Facially, the example of the Israeli Arabs illustrates a symmetric externalization: Just 
as future generations of Israelis Jews will bear part of the costs instead of those living today, 
so too future generations of Israeli Arabs will receive part of the consideration instead of the 
                                                                                                                                                          
diminish, and at a certain stage, the deferment begins to harm him.  
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populations. Subjectively, however, we have suggested that whereas the Jews might consider 
mainly the effect of the deal on their individual standard of living, the Arab minority might 
attach a very high value to the state recognition of their equal status as a community. Hence, 
whereas deferment of the scheme would be very beneficial for every individual Jew, it would 
be of less significance to the Arabs who might perceive this social agreement as a 
“constitutional moment”
19 for their community. In constitutional moments such as this, the 
present generation tends to rise above its own particularistic current interests and ascribes 
greater importance to the affects of its decision upon the community as a whole, including its 
future generations.  
Thus, taking into account the subjective values of the parties, one might conceive 
circumstances in which the costs of deferment to the present generation of Arabs would be 
lower than the benefits it grants to the present generations of Jews. 
 
 
C. Sides’ Exchange 
 
Facially, a deferment enabling sides’ exchange will always operate symmetrically on 
both parties: the deferment reduces the consideration given by one party at exactly the same 
rate as it reduces the consideration received by the other party. Nevertheless, the prospect of 
sides’ exchange may create benefits for the givers, which are higher than the costs it imposes 
on the receivers, and thus increases the joint benefit created by the agreement. Accordingly, 
deferment in asymmetrical cases is more effective in increasing the chance of reaching 
agreement than in symmetrical cases.  
An example of a deferment, which has an asymmetric effect on the parties is the case 
of the Disabled Law. 
The Disabled Law. State A is considering the enactment of a law that imposes 
an additional tax on the healthy population and subsidizes the disabled. The 
healthy population opposes such a law because it goes beyond what they are 
willing to pay to support the disabled. 
 
Deferring the implementation of the law may increase the healthy population’s 
                                                 
19 The expression “constitutional moment” is borrowed from Bruce Ackerman, We the People (Harvard 
University Press, 1991). The features of the “constitutional moment” are discussed in Ackerman, ibid 170. The 
constitutional moment in American History dealt with by Ackerman is described in: Federalist No.10, at 
C.Rossiter Ed. (1961), 78 (J.Madison) 
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becoming disabled in the future and the probability of such an undesirable contingency, as it is 
estimated at the present, increases with the lapse of time. It follows that every healthy person 
knows that at the time of the future implementation of the law he may be on the receiving side. 
Concededly, the disabled population is interested in the immediate implementation of the law, 
but since such agreement cannot be attained, it has the choice of adopting a law whose 
implementation is deferred or not to adopt any law. Under these circumstances the disabled 
population would support a deferred-implementation-law. The healthy population on the other 
hand would support a law whose implementation is deferred not only because during the 
deferred period they are not required to pay anything, but also because when the 
implementation date arrives some of them might become disabled and benefit from the law. 
This is an example of an asymmetric case, because the possibility of sides’ exchange is mostly 
one sided: healthy people may become disabled, but many disabled persons are doomed to 
remain in their unfavorable position. 
In other cases, the potential of sides’ exchange is objectively symmetric but due to 
different assessments of this potential by the givers and the receivers, it becomes asymmetric 
and occasionally enhances the chances to reach an agreement. The example of unemployment 
illustrates this. In this example, the unemployed were unable to compensate the workers for 
their waiver of a day’s work and thus the workers would probably oppose the law. However, 
knowing that in fifteen years they might also become unemployed, the workers would be more 
supportive of such a law if its implementation would be deferred by fifteen years. Equally, 
every unemployed person knows that in another fifteen years he may be one of the workers 
who will be forced to waive a day’s work.  
Even though the consideration given by the workers decreases by reason of the 
deferment at the same rate as the reduction of the consideration received by the unemployed, 
due to the endowment effect it is expected that the benefit the workers derive from deferment 
would be higher than the cost the unemployed incur from the same deferment. The 
endowment effect mandates that owners of an asset tend to ascribe it greater value than 
others.
20 Likewise, it is conceivable that workers attach greater value to their right to work 
than those unemployed who are not in possession of such a right. Nonetheless, the workers 
                                                 
20 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L.Knetch & Richard H.Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status 
Quo Bias, in Richard H.Thaler, The Winner’s Curse – Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life (Princeton 
University Press, 1992) 63; Daniel Hahneman, Jack L.Knetch & Richard H.Thaler, Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem in Behavioural Law & Economics (Cambridge University Press, 
2000, Cass R. Sunstein ed.) 211; Russel B.Korobkin & Thomas S.Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
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lose their jobs. Therefore, from their perspective the deferred arrangement preserves part of 
the asset currently in their possession and not only endangers it. Such deferment however, 
would not carry similar implications for the unemployed because at the time the agreement is 
reached this group is not affected by the endowment effect. Thus, the workers’ benefit from 
deferment is larger than the cost it imposes on the unemployed.  
    
 
III. The Normative Justifications for Deferred Implementation 
 
In the previous parts of the paper we argued that deferring the implementation of social 
agreements could be an effective technique to reach such agreements, because occasionally 
the deferment externalizes part of the implementation costs to third parties and opens the door 
for sides’ exchange. In this part of the paper we propose two justifications for using the 
technique of deferred implementation, and characterize the situations in which these 
justifications become particularly relevant. We will then examine a seemingly strong counter 
argument according to which the deferment of a social agreement is anti-democratic, and 




A. Sides’ Exchange—Taking Decisions Behind the “Veil of Ignorance” 
 
A consequence of the potential for sides’ exchange caused by deferred implementation 
is that it tends to bring the individual members of the groups attempting to conclude a social 
agreement, closer to the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”. As a result it increases the likelihood 
that the social agreement achieved will also be just and fair according to the Rawlsian 
criterion.
21  
An individual behind the veil of ignorance does not know whether he is rich or poor, 
strong or weak, or of a high or low social status. Being behind the veil of ignorance, an 
                                                                                                                                                          
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Calif.L.Rev. 1951, 1107. (2000). 
21J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) 60 – 108. For discussing different methods 
(including deferring of implementation) that can be used in order to approximate legislators to the veil of 
ignorance, thereby moderating conflict of interests, see Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in 
Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L.J. 399 (2001). [To elaborate]. Our utilization of the Rawlsian theory of justice is 
by way of analogy or inspiration, and is not a direct application of Rawl’s theory. … 
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in a state of pure neutrality. In the spirit of Rawl’s theory of justice it can be claimed that rules 
and principles adopted in that manner would be just and fair.
22 In reality, people required to 
establish the rules and principles to be applied to a society are not free of self interests, and 
will be presumably biased in favor of their own interests or the interest of the group to which 
they belong over other interests. Thus, a veil of ignorance is a metaphor for impartiality and 
neutrality to which decision makers should aspire. 
Our claim is that one can create a Rawlsian veil of ignorance for the individuals of the 
groups in a social agreement, or at least approximate it by deferring implementation, which 
creates a potential for sides’ exchange. In the ideal scenario, deferred implementation creates a 
situation in which all members of either group at the time of the implementation of the social 
agreement have the same chance of belonging to either the giving or the receiving group, and 
are aware of that. For example, in the case of unemployment, if deferred implementation 
creates a situation in which all members of both groups (the workers and the unemployed), 
share an identical assessment of likelihood of their being workers or unemployed at the time 
of implementation, then their decision whether to agree to a division of work in the spirit of 
the French solution is in effect an unbiased decision, adopted from behind the veil of 
ignorance. Obviously this does not mean that they would agree to adopt the French solution, 
for it may have shortcomings (e.g. reduction of incentives to invest in work) occasioned 
thereby. But at all events, the decision of each of the individuals of the groups would not be 
affected by whether he was currently a worker or unemployed, for as stated, he has no way of 
knowing which group he will belong to at the time of the implementation of the social 
agreement 
In reality, the likelihood of a person working today still being employed in another 15 
years probably exceeds the likelihood that a person currently unemployed will be employed in 
another 15 years. The workers will therefore not relate to the proposal to follow the French 
solution – even if implemented in 15 years - in the same way as they would have related to it 
had they been positioned behind the veil of ignorance. Still, because of the deferment of the 
implementation, their individual interest in opposing it would be moderated by the higher 
prospects of being unemployed, making it easier for them to agree. The deferred agreement 
achieved would be close though not identical to the agreement that would have been reached 
by people deciding from behind the veil of ignorance. Thus, as the implementation date is 
                                                 
22 Rawls, ibid., 136.  
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according to Rawls criteria. 
 
 
B. Sharing the Burden of the Agreement by all the Beneficiaries 
 
Can deferred implementation be justified when such deferment externalizes costs to 
third parties? As explained above, the law generally takes a hostile attitude toward 
externalizations, and frequently prohibits them. The law takes a less hostile attitude toward 
externalizations in the context of social agreements. In fact, many social schemes for 
redistribution of wealth externalize costs to the givers, in the sense that they are required to 
bear much of the costs of the schemes, regardless of their consent. Arguably, therefore, 
deferring the implementation of a social agreement for redistribution merely reduces the 
burden that the redistribution scheme imposes on the rich group of the present generation and 
allows them to share part of the burden with the rich group of the future generations. Such 
externalization to future generations is particularly justified in cases where an immediate 
implementation would impose a very heavy burden on a certain group in present society but 
would benefit the future generations. Allowing the group of givers in present society to 
externalize some of its costs to the future generations who are expected to benefit from the 
implementation of the agreement, is justified on fairness grounds, since it burdens all the 
beneficiaries of the agreement with its costs, and not only part of them. Moreover, it is often 
very likely, that without those externalizations, a socially beneficial agreement would never be 
reached.   
Philosophical and legal writings discuss very thoroughly the risk that the present 
generation would externalize costs to future generations. These writings tend to downplay, 
however, the mirror problem—which is just as prevalent as the risk of externalizations—that 
the present generation is often forced to confer benefits to future generations without being 
able to charge them anything in return. A deferred implementation is one mechanism which 
allows the present generation to charge the future generations for benefits the latter receive, 
thereby motivates the present generation to adopt desirable redistribution schemes, they would 
have never adopted otherwise.  
Having said that, we are aware of the substantial risk of deferred implementation 
agreements being abused by present generations. In the next section we offer constitutional 
constraints to be imposed on deferment of social agreements, ensuring that only those deferred 
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C. The Anti Democratic Aspect of Deferred Implementation 
 
Concluding a social agreement with deferred implementation requires an effective 
method of immunizing the agreement against future changes. The mutability of a deferred 
agreement upon the arrival of the time of implementation may render its initial attainment 
superfluous. Consider first the example of the French solution to unemployment. Arguably, 
society could not reach an agreement on such a solution because the majority of people in 
society were workers. Assuming the unemployment rate will not change dramatically at the 
time of implementation, the working group will still outnumber the unemployed and, 
therefore, just as the majority at present refuses an immediate implementation, the majority in 
the future would support a repeal of the law. Similarly, deferred implementation externalizing 
costs to future generations may be confronted with the refusal of the future generations to bear 
the costs, and this refusal may lead to the termination of the social agreement. The ability of 
the current majority to prevent a future majority from terminating or modifying the deferred 
agreement at the time of implementation is therefore a precondition for the effectiveness of the 
technique of deferred implementation.  
Therefore, the social agreements we advocate in this paper will be effective only if 
they become part of the constitution or if the constitution empowers the parties to immune the 
social agreement from future repeal. Absent such immunity, deferred social agreements are 
unlikely to be concluded.
23 Herein however lies the difficulty. In many democratic states, 
limiting the power of a future majority to change the law is regarded as illegitimate and 
inconsistent with the basic foundations of democracy. Thus, in Britain the Parliament cannot 
immune its statutes against future changes by a majority of members of parliament.
24 In other 
states, the power conferred by the legal system to the current majority to immune its laws 
against future change, is limited and is conferred exclusively to a constitutive body and not to 
                                                 
23 However, even if a social agreement whose implementation is deferred is not immunized against future 
changes, occasionally it may be difficult to change it upon the date of its implementation because a status quo is 
more easily maintained than changed. Hence, in the case of the Israeli Arabs, were the Jews to attempt to repeal 
the social agreement at the time of its implementation, they would encounter serious opposition on the part of the 
Israeli Arabs, as well as from numerous Jews.  
24 S.De.Smith & R.Braizer, Constitutional and Administrative Law (7
th ed., 1994) 79; A.W. Bradley & 
K.D.Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (12
th ed., 1997) 63. 
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25 Moreover, it is questionable whether the constitution may 
include substantive arrangement such as redistribution schemes, and whether courts that 
recognize the power of the founding fathers to dictate redistribution schemes to future 
generations, would recognize the legitimacy of an attempt to dictate such a scheme when it 
includes a deferred-implementation-clause. Arguably the reason we seldom see such deferred 
implementation laws adopted, is the fear of present generations that the law would not sustain 
the power and the will of the majority of the future generation to repeal it. 
One of the most powerful justifications for recognizing the power of the current 
majority to harness the majority’s power, both current and future, is that such constraint serves 
the majority interest (and of the minority) to commit itself towards the minority, and thus 
merits the cooperation of the minority. Since legislative power resides in the majority, the 
minority may have the niggling suspicion that at some stage in the future it might exploit its 
legislative majority power and deprive the minority of the consideration it was promised in 
return for its cooperation. In order to allay this justified fear, in the absence of which there is 
no possibility of agreement being attained, there must be an effective way for the majority to 
entrench the rights of the minority against future infringement of their rights by the majority. 
The overwhelming interest of the majority is therefore to deny itself, and any other future 
majority, the power to change the law in a way that deprives the minority of the protections it 
was promised. It would appear that this justification does not hold for the schemes we 
advocate in this paper. In the case of sides’ exchange, one of the principal reasons for the 
majority’s readiness to adopt the deferred social agreement which benefits the minority, is that 
the individuals comprising the majority know, that there is a real possibility that in the future 
they will comprise the minority, and therefore benefit from the agreement, and not only bear 
its costs. Similarly, in cases involving cost externalization both the majority and the minority 
agree to deferred implementation because they know that third parties who may be the 
majority in the future, will bear the costs of the social agreement, while they will be its prime 
beneficiaries. In short, in most of the cases discussed in the article, from the majority’s 
perspective, the entrenchment of the deferred social agreement against change is not motivated 
by its desire to effectively protect the minority, but rather by its desire to protect the 
                                                 
25 S.5 of the American Constitution entrenches against any change in the constitutional provision granting every 
state an equal number of Senators in the United States Senate.  
Section 139 of the Italian constitution provides entrenchment against any change in the republican character of 
the regime. 
Section 79 (3) of the Basic Law of Germany ( Grundgesetz) entrenches against any change in the division of the 
German Federation of States, the participation of the states in legislative procedures and the fundamental 
principles of the basic law. 
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future.
26  
If the future majority is motivated by its desire to protect the constituents of the 
majority and not the minority, then the protection of the minority cannot serve as the rational 
for restricting the legislative power of future generations. Furthermore, the current majority’s 
motivation for protecting its own constituents, and only them creates a basis for the claim of 
illegitimacy, which may raise the ire of future generations. The present majority imposed an 
onus on the future generation, which it was not prepared to shoulder itself. The pension 
example is a case in point. According to that example, the “adults” and the “youth” would not 
have been able to reach agreement on the immediate implementation of the pension 
arrangement because the youth was unwilling to bear the pension burden of the adults. The 
only way of reaching such an agreement was by deferring implementation and imposing the 
main part of the burden on the shoulders of the “children” who, at the actual commencement 
of pension arrangement will constitute the group of the youth. One can definitely presume that 
at the implementation time, the youth of that time will deny the legitimacy of the actual 
arrangement and will criticize the adults of that time, claiming that they are not interested in 
bearing the onus for the benefit of the adults who displayed a disinterest for their interests in 
the past, and were unwilling to bear a similar onus as the youth are now being required to 
bear.
27
Although the common justifications for the power of one generation to restrict the 
legislative power of future generations may not support the deferred-implementation schemes 
we advocate in this paper, we believe there are alternative justifications for it. The legitimacy 
                                                 
26 Prima facie, there is nothing wrong in the fact that the motive of the majority in its protection of the minority 
is its fear that the majority may become the minority. Hence, for example, there is nothing wrong with the white 
majority entrenching the rights of the black minority only because of its fear that in the future the whites will 
become the minority. But the source of legitimacy of this entrenchment is in the fact that the entrenching 
generation bore the onus in exactly the same manner as did generation upon whom the entrenchment was forced. 
In other words, the white majority protecting the minority’s rights because of its fear of being in the minority in 
the future, will in the future be able to receive legitimization from the future black majority for such a protection 
only if in the past, when the whites were the majority (and blacks the minority), the whites protected the 
minority’s rights. If the whites adopt a rule that protects the minority rights only in ten years from now, when 
they are in the minority, it is presumable that the future black majority, if it deems that when it was a minority it 
was not properly protected, will not acknowledge the legitimacy of this constitutional principle. 
27 Facially, the deferment of the pension arrangement creates a problem similar to that created by the deferment 
of the prohibition of slave trade. In both cases the deferment imposes costs on groups that were not parties to the 
social agreement. In the first case, the costs are imposed on ancestors of the current generation and in the second 
case the costs are borne by the present slaves. Clearly, both the ancestors and the slaves could be expected to 
object to the deferment that was agreed upon. A basic difference however separates the cases: in the first case, 
when the ancestors grow up they will desire to revoke the arrangement and release themselves from the onus 
imposed upon them by the previous generation. The slaves on the other hand, will support the proscription of 
slave trade when the deferred time arrives, regardless of whether they were slaves at the time of the 
  23
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressof the deferred agreement can be justified on the basis of an anomaly innate to the democratic 
system -- the present generation has deficient incentives to benefit future generations because 
it cannot charge those generations for the benefits conferred to them. To illustrate, assume that 
the present generation should invest 15 for generating benefits of 20, to be equally shared by 
the present and next generations. Absent the ability of the present generation to charge at least 
5 from the next generation, the present generation would be reluctant to invest the costs of 15 
in the first place. This anomaly could be avoided if all the generations were represented at the 
legislative body. More realistically, the problem can be solved by allowing a generation that 
benefits future generations to charge the latter some of the costs it incurred in creating those 
benefits. Such a charge would be justified because it solves the inherent inefficiency we have 
just described and also because it promotes intergenerational justice. A deferred 
implementation agreement, which externalizes costs to future generations, functions as a 
mechanism for charging those generations for the benefits the present generation conferred to 
them, and is justified as long as there is a reasonable relationship between the costs and the 
gains externalized to the future generations.   
The next generation would respect restrictions imposed by the present generation, that 
promote intergenerational justice, not only because these restrictions are intergenerational 
efficient and fair, but also because it is in the next generation’s best interest to respect it. To 
see why, one should envision the constitution as a repeated game between generations – any 
generation that ignores the restrictions imposed by the previous generation and refuses to pay 
the price the previous generation charges for a social agreement that promotes intergeneration 
justice, cuts the chain of repeated games and loses its own power to adopt similar social 
agreements. The fact that the next generation respects the deferred agreements adopted by the 
previous generation, preserves the power of the next generation to restrain the generation 
following it.  
We may conclude, therefore, that as with any constitutional restraint, its legitimacy 
does not flow exclusively from the procedure guiding its acceptance, but more so from its 
substance. Unjust constitutions would not be respected by future generations, at least not 
voluntarily, even if they were adopted in a “proper” procedure. Similarly, unjust social 
agreements with a deferred-implementation clause will not be respected if they exploit the 
next generation. Thus, in the pension example discussed, if the arrangement were adopted so 
that its entire onus was transferred from the shoulders of the youth of the current generation to 
                                                                                                                                                          
constitution’s adoption or born thereafter.  
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http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art37those of the next generation, then its legitimacy would certainly be suspect and it is unlikely 
that courts of next generation would enforce it. If on the other hand the onus of the pension 
arrangement was allocated fairly between the generations, then it would probably be in the 
best interest of the next generation to enforce it, at least for the sake of preserving its own 
power to adopt similar social agreements. 
Similarly, one may assume that if in the example of unemployment, all of the workers 
had known as a matter of certainty that in another 15 years they would be unemployed, then 
the deferred implementation would not have been legitimate. Probably, the workers in 15 
years time would challenge the legitimacy of the deferred social agreement and refuse to 
comply with it. On the other hand, if there was a reasonable likelihood, say 20%, of sides’ 
exchange and it was clear to all that the workers of today, in reaching the social arrangement, 
assumed a heavy burden, the legitimacy of the social agreement would increase, and even be 
recognized by those who were to become workers in another 15 years, and would bear the 





This article attempted to show that the deferred implementation of a social agreement 
frequently allows sides’ exchange and externalizes costs to third parties, thereby increases the 
chances of attaining socially desirable agreements. In many cases the deferred social 
agreement is more just and fair than an agreement to be implemented immediately, since it 
often creates intergenerational justice by imposing the costs of the social agreement upon all 
the generations standing to gain from it, and not just on the present generation. In other cases 
the deferment of the social agreement enables the individuals constituting the contracting 
parties to adopt less partial decisions, as if they were viewing the subject of the agreement 
from behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. We have shown that deferred social agreement 
can gain its legitimacy despite the attendant harnessing of the discretion of the coming 
generations and the coming legislators, provided that it ensures intergenerational justice.  
We believe that the paucity of deferred-implementation agreements
28 stems from the 
                                                 
28 Here are few examples of deferred-implementation arrangements: The Amended Proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeovers Bids (unpublished draft, 1999), 
aimed at prohibiting the use of “poisoned peels” in order to prevent hostile takeovers, included a clause which 
stipulated that the Directive would become effective only in 2010; initially the Scandinavian states objected to 
the passage of the Proposal, whereas Germany and France supported it. But the Proposal was rejected by the EU 
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressconcern of the present generation that next generations would not respect these agreements 
and would not recognize their legitimacy. In this paper we have argued that in many cases this 
concern is unfounded and that the deferred implementation of social agreements is not just a 
technique to facilitate consensus for the redistribution of wealth, but that it might also be 
legitimate, desirable and just. 
                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                          
parliament for other reasons. 
The declaration for the transfer of Hong Kong into Chinese control was signed in 1984 and determined that the 
transfer would take place in 1997 (a deferment of 13 years). In one of the declaration’s appendices it states that 
the rental rights in the Hong Kong lands, which were under British control, may be extended for another fifty 
years after the day of their transfer to China, i.e. until 2047. See: Joint Declaration of the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of Great 
China on the Question of Hong Kong.  
In a few cases it was determined that the validity of a law or legal arrangement expire after a few years. Deferred 
implementation is not the same as implementation for a limited period. Nonetheless there is a certain similarity 
between the two techniques and even of the purposes for which they are used. In the Treaty for the 
Establishment of the European Community for Coal and Steal 1957, it was determined that the treaty would 
remain in force for a period of fifty years from its date of commencement.  
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